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Abstract 
We define and examine the performance of three minimal strategic market games 
(sell-all, buy-sell, and double auction) in laboratory relative to the predictions of theory. 
Unlike open or partial equilibrium settings of most other experiments, these closed 
exchange economies have limited amounts of cash to facilitate transactions, and include 
feedback. General equilibrium theory, since it abstracts away from market mechanisms 
and has no role for money or credit, makes no predictions about how the paths of 
convergence to the competitive equilibrium may differ across alternative mechanisms. 
Introduction of markets and money as carriers of process creates the possibility of 
motion. The laboratory data reveal different paths, and different levels of allocative 
efficiency in the three settings. The results suggest that abstracting away from all 
institutional details does not help understand dynamic aspects of market behavior. For 
example, the oligopoly effect of feedback from buying an endowed good is missed. 
Inclusion of mechanism differences into theory may enhance our understanding of 
important aspects of markets and money and help link conventional equilibrium analysis 
with dynamics. 
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Three Minimal Market Institutions with Human and 
Algorithmic Agents: Theory and Experimental Evidence 
 
1.  MINIMAL MARKET INSTITUTIONS 
In this paper we define three minimal market institutions, and compare their 
theoretical properties to the outcomes observed in laboratory experiments with human 
agents and with simple algorithmic agents. These mechanisms are stripped of details and 
retain only the basic features necessary to be trading games playable in laboratory. Three 
price formation mechanisms considered here, listed by the nature of the strategy sets in a 
single market for each trader, are: 
1.  The sell-all model (strategy set of dimension 1); 
2.  The buy-sell model (strategy set of dimension 2)
2; 
3.   The simultaneous double auction model (strategy set of dimension 2 or 4). 
These mechanisms utilize a commodity money for trade, and are described in Section 
2. We find that non-cooperative and competitive general equilibrium solutions provide 
reasonable but imperfect static benchmarks to organize the laboratory observations. In 
absence of a widely accepted dynamic learning or disequilibrium theory, we compare the 
market outcomes of trading by profit-motivated humans to the outcomes of two simple 
computer simulations using minimally intelligent and adaptive learning algorithms as 
traders. The properties of even these minimal market mechanisms diverge when the 
number of traders is small. This differentiation raises questions of the appropriate level of 
specificity/generality for useful study of market mechanisms, to which we return in the 
final section of the paper.  
The development of general competitive and non-cooperative equilibrium models has 
been followed during the recent decades by documentation of the properties of specific 
market institutions in game theory, industrial organization, experimental gaming, and 
experimental economics. The present study is an attempt to fill a gap that remained next 
to the abstract Walrasian end of the spectrum which is bereft of all institutional details.  
                                                 
2 Generically the dimensionality of the strategy set of the buy-sell model is two per market—the number of 
owned units of the good offered for sale and units of money bid to buy that good. In the laboratory 
implementation reported here, each individual was endowed with only one of the two goods, thus reducing 
the strategy set to dimension one per market—the number of owned units of one good offered for sale and 
the units of money bid to buy the other good.  
 Huber, Shubik, and Sunder, Three Minimal Market Institutions, 6/26/2009  3 
Partial equilibrium exchange markets have been modeled as games in strategic form 
solved for their non-cooperative equilibria starting with Cournot 1838 (1897), Bertrand 
1883, and Edgeworth 1925, followed by many others. Nash 1951, provided the full 
generalization of the concept of a non-cooperative equilibrium and Dubey 1982, Dubey 
and Shubik 1978, 1980, Quint and Shubik 2005, Shapley 1995, Shapley and Shubik. 
1977, Shubik 1973, Sorin 1996 and several others extended the analysis to closed 
economies.  There is also a related partial equilibrium literature introducing uncertainty 
into auction and double auction models as is evinced by the work of Vickery 1961, 
Griesmer, Levitan and Shubik 1967,  Milgrom and Weber 1982, Satterthwaite and 
Williams 1989. 
There are two other relevant literatures: one in macro-economics stressing rational 
expectations (exemplified by Lucas, 1987, 1988, Lucas and Sargent 1981) and the other 
in mathematical finance mostly on competitive partial equilibrium open models dealing 
explicitly with money, transactions costs, and the constraints on cash flows.  All 
approaches broadly involve money, markets and financial institutions. There has been 
considerable gaming activity on bargaining, bidding and on the emergence of competitive 
prices in some simple markets with little stress on the explicit role of money (Marimon, 
Spear and Sunder 1993, Lim, Prescott and Sunder 1994, and Marimon and Sunder 1993, 
1994, 1995).  Our paper presents gaming with a role for money; two other papers include 
credit and other financial instruments in addition to money (Huber et al. 2008a, 2008b). 
Experiments that examine the properties of markets and competition (Smith 1982, 
Plott 1982) show that markets with only a few independent individual traders often yield 
outcomes in close neighborhood of competitive equilibrium predictions. Most 
experimentation has involved trade in a single market. In the spirit of general 
equilibrium, we consider two markets. We formulate experimentally playable strategic 
market games where the trade is mediated by money, but the overall system is closed. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: In Section 2 the three minimal 
institutions are described. Section 3 gives the general and non-cooperative equilibrium 
predictions for each institution which serve as static benchmarks for comparing the 
experimental data. Section 4 describes two dynamic benchmarks—minimally intelligent
3 
                                                 
3 Since Gode and Sunder’s “zero intelligence” agents originally defined for double auctions had to be 
modified to operate in broader classes of market environments, we changed the label to “minimally 
intelligent.” Huber, Shubik, and Sunder, Three Minimal Market Institutions, 6/26/2009  4 
and adaptive learning algorithmic traders.  Section 5 describes the experimental setup we 
used to implement these markets in the laboratory with human traders. The results are 
presented in Section 6, followed by some concluding remarks. 
2.  THREE MINIMAL MARKET GAMES 
We examine three mechanisms which are minimal in the following sense.  In order to 
reflect an exchange economy with money we need at least two commodities in addition 
to money whose special properties we wish to explore. A game cannot have less than one 
information set and less than one move per player. If they move simultaneously there will 
be one information set. Further, price should be at least generically sensitive to, i.e., be a 
function of, bids and offers.  In the sell-all game, the  money bid for each commodity is 
the single move in each market, and calculation of price as the ratio of the sum of money 
bid and total available quantity of the commodity is the simplest price function. If the 
mechanism is to satisfy an additional requirement that agents either buy or sell (and 
possibly do both) in the market for each commodity, we get the buy-sell as the minimal 
mechanism; the strategy set still has dimension 1 although it consists of the quantity of 
endowed good offered for sale in one market, and the quantity of money bid in the other 
market. Finally, the requirement that individuals be able to specify their price and 
quantity limits leads to a double sealed bid as the minimal mechanism  with a four 
dimensional strategy set, although we use sequential double auction in this paper because 
its properties have been studied extensively in the experimental gaming literature.  It 
differs from the double auction sealed bid in the number of information sets. 
2.1 Definitions 
Money 
In each market game two commodities are traded and one more instrument is used as 
a means of payment (money). This money is introduced as a linear term in the subjects’ 
utility functions.
4  
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Bids 
 (1)  A money bid:  A trader i bids an amount of money b
i
j for the j
th commodity.  The 
trader has no reserve price and accepts the market price. This allows a simple quantity bid 
for a mechanism similar to Cournot’s 1897. The market clearing mechanism gives the 




j /pj of good j where pj  is the market price that is formed collectively 
by individual bids and offers.  
 (2)  A price-quantity bid:  Suppose that a trader i instead of offering an amount of 
money to buy a good j, bids a personal unit price p
i
j he is willing to pay to buy up to an 
amount  q
i
j of the good.  It is reasonable to expect that he is willing to buy q
i
j or less at a 
price less than or equal to p
i





be less than or equal to the individual’s credit line plus cash. Since we do not consider a 




j cannot exceed the 
available cash. Minor variations of these bids consider any upper or lower bounds on prices 
or quantities acceptable to the bidder.  
Offers 
  Analogously, there are two simple forms of offers.  
 (1)  A non-contingent offer to sell: Suppose that an individual i owns a
i
j units of good j 




j units for sale 
at the market-determined price. 
  A somewhat more complex action, but still not involving any more information and 
confined to a single move is: 





j.) of good j at unit price p
i
j.  It is reasonable to expect that she is willing to sell q
i
j or 
less for a price more than or equal to p
i
j.   
  We use observable acts to buy (bids) and sell (offers) as the building blocks to 
construct three simple market games. Simplifying them any further will prevent any 
trading. The first two market games involve a single move by every agent, taken 
simultaneously. The third, double auction, involves sequential multiple moves by various 
players. Each game can be generalized to multiple plays. 
 Consider  n individuals where i has an endowment a
 i
j of good j (j = 1, …,  m) and an 
endowment M
i of money.  Suppose there are m markets, one for each good j where it can 
be exchanged for money. A plausible restriction on the market mechanism is that all trades Huber, Shubik, and Sunder, Three Minimal Market Institutions, 6/26/2009  6 
in a given market take place at the same time and the same price.  This requires that p
i
j = pj 
for i = 1, … n. 
  In general, we cannot assume that bids in one market are independent of bids in the 
others.  There is at least a cash or credit budget constraint that links actions across markets.   
2.2 The Sell-All Model 
  This is the simplest of the three models. Consider n traders trading in m+1 goods, 
where the m+1
st good has a special operational role, in addition to its possible utility in  








i ≥ 0 for all j = 1, ..., m+1 and a
i
m+1 = M
i, and the utility u
i = u
i(x1, ..., xm, xm+1), where  
u
i need not actually depend directly on xm+1;  a fiat money is not excluded.  
  In order to keep strategies simple, let us suppose that the traders are required to offer 
for sale all of their holdings of the first m goods. Instead of owning their initial bundle of 
endowments outright; the traders own a claim on the proceeds when the bundle is sold at 
the prevailing market price. 
  Suppose there is one trading post for each of the first m commodities, where the total 
supplies (a1, ..., am) are deposited for sale "on consignment," so to speak. Each trader i 
submits bids by allocating amounts b
i
j of his endowment m
i of the m+1
st commodity 
among the m trading posts, j = 1,..., m.  There are a number of possible rules governing the 
permitted range of bids.  In the simplest case, with no credit of any kind, the limits on b
i
j 
are given by: 
  An interpretation of this spending limit is that the traders are required to pay cash in 
advance for their purchases. The prices are formed from the simultaneously submitted bids 
of all buyers; we define 
pj =bj / aj, j = 1, ..., m . 
Thus, bids precede prices. Traders allocate their budgets fiscally, committing specific 
quantities of their means of payment to the purchase of each good without definite 
knowledge of what the per-unit price will be (and how many units of each good their bid 
will get them). At an equilibrium this will not matter, as prices will be what the traders 
expect them to be.  In a multi-period context, moreover, the traders will know the previous 
prices and may expect that variations in individual behavior in a mass market will not 
.     ,   1,   =     , 0        and
1





j … ≥ ≤ ∑
=
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change prices by much.  But any deviation from expectations will result in changing the 
quantities of goods received, and not in the quantities of cash spent.  In a mass market, the 
difference between the outcomes from allocating a portion of one's budget for purchase of a 
certain good, and from a decision to buy a specific amount at an unspecified price, will not 
be too different.   
  The prices in the model are determined so that they exactly balance the books at each 
trading post. The amount x
i
j of the j
th good that the i




His final balance of the m+1
st good, taking account of his sales as well as his purchases, is 
2.3 The Buy-Sell Model  
  Subjects face a more complex task in the buy-sell model: instead of one money bid in 
each of the two markets in sell-all, they submit the quantity of their endowed good they 
wish to sell, and the money bid for the other good they want to buy. Thus they enter only 
one number in each market but these numbers are in different dimensions (goods and 
money). Since moves are simultaneous, there are no contingencies in this market either. 
Physical quantities of goods are submitted for sale and quantities of money are submitted 
for purchases, and the markets are cleared. The mechanism does not permit any 
underemployment of resources.
5 The amount x
i
j of the j
th good that the i
th trader receives in 
return for his bid b
i
j is: 
However price is somewhat different as it depends on the quantities of each good offered 
for sale (and not on the endowment of each good): 
pj = b j /q j, j = 1, ..., m . 
 
                                                 
5 Except when there is no bid or offer, in which instance all resources are returned to their owners. If they 
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His final amount of the m+1
st good, taking account of trader i’s sales as well as his 
purchases, is 












1 + m ∑ ∑  
2.4 The Sequential Bid-Offer or Double Auction Model 
  Any trader is free to submit a bid in either market to buy one unit at or below a 
specified price, and an ask to sell one unit at or above a specified price as long as he has 
the money (to buy) or good (to sell). The computer screen shows all outstanding bids in 
descending order and all outstanding asks in ascending order. Traders are free to accept 
the lowest outstanding bid or the highest outstanding ask and consummate a trade. If the 
highest bid and lowest ask cross, a trade is automatically recorded at that price.   
  The double auction model doubles the size of the strategy set, changing price into a 
strategic variable from a mere outcome of the quantity strategies in the sell-all and buy-sell 
models. In each of the m markets, an individual’s strategy has four components (p, q; p
*, 
q
*) where the first pair of numbers is interpreted as an offer to sell amount q or less for a 
price p or more, and the next pair is a bid to buy amount q
* or less at a price p
* or less. 
  From the viewpoint of both game theory and experimental gaming the number of 
decisions in a double auction is more than in the other two markets. Imposing a condition 
that one can either buy or sell, but not both, is a possible theoretical simplification. In 
practice, however, an individual can be a buyer or a seller or a trader.  Most consumers are 
buyers and most producers are sellers of specific commodities or services; a trader can be 
active on both sides of the market. 
In these games the terminal amount of money (M – b + pa) held by each individual 
was added to their dollar payoffs. This served to fix the price level that the transactions 
would be expected to approach towards the end. The observed divergence between these 
predicted and realized prices in some cases was considerable, and is discussed later. 
3. GENERAL AND NON-COOPERATIVE EQUILIBRIA 
  The non-cooperative equilibrium (NCE) solution is a fairly natural game theoretic way 
to approach these games without any direct communication. A non-cooperative equilibrium 
satisfies the existence of mutually consistent expectations. If each predicts that the other 
will play his strategy associated with a non-cooperative equilibrium the actions of all will 
be self-confirming. No one acting individually will have an incentive to deviate from this Huber, Shubik, and Sunder, Three Minimal Market Institutions, 6/26/2009  9 
equilibrium. This could be called an outcome consistent with “rational expectations,” but as 
the outcome may be neither unique nor generically optimal, the label of “rational” is best 
avoided. 
  The competitive general equilibrium (CGE) solution is defined as the set of prices that 
clear all markets efficiently. In general, the mathematical structure of NCE and CGE differ. 
However, it can be shown in theory that, as the number of traders in a market increases, 
under reasonable conditions, the NCE approaches the CGE. In symmetric markets without 
face-to-face communication experimentation can verify that with as few as 5-10 traders on 
each side, the outcomes approximate the CGE, and any differences between the two can be 
explained by the NCE.  
3.1. The Non-Cooperative Equilibrium in the Sell-All Market 
  Sell-all is the simplest model and for experimental purposes we keep the payoff 
structure simple to explain to subjects untutored in economics or mathematics: 
pa b M xy + − + α  
where α is an appropriately chosen parameter (explained in the discussion of the game), the 
square root of xy is a simple Cobb-Douglas utility function whose range of values is 
furnished in a coarse-grid table in order to ease the computational burden. The linear term 
(M – b + pa) is the residual amount of money (initial endowment less the amount of money 
bid plus earnings from selling a units at price p).
6 
  The mathematical solutions of this model under different constraints are given in 
Appendix B. Table 1 shows the NCE for markets with 2, 3, 4, 5, 10 and many traders on 
each side for the parameter values used in the experiment. 
(Insert Table 1 about here) 
3.2. The Non-cooperative Equilibrium in the Buy-Sell Market 
  The basic difference between the sell-all and the buy-sell model lies in the freedom 
subjects have to control the amount of goods to sell in the market for the endowed good 
(see Table 2). The general formulae for the NCE are given in Appendix B.  
(Insert Table 2 about here) 
3.3. The Non-cooperative Equilibrium in the Double-Auction Model 
                                                 
6 The utilization of a money with a Marshallian or constant marginal utility can be interpreted in terms of a 
known expectation of the worth of future purchasing power. In this context any change in price level can be 
attributed to error and learning the equilibrium of the actual game is stationary. This device provides an 
easy and logically consistent way in an experimental game to provide terminal conditions. Huber, Shubik, and Sunder, Three Minimal Market Institutions, 6/26/2009  10 
  For simplicity, the bid-offer market is modeled as a simultaneous sealed bid auction. 
The clearing method for the one-shot game is simplicity itself. Bids are assembled in a 
down-sloping histogram and offers in an up-sloping histogram.  Market price is formed 
where the two lines intersect.
7  
  The double auction used in the experiment is a continuous process where bids and 
offers flow in sequentially and a trade takes place whenever they match or cross. We use 
this continuous double auction rather than the simultaneous sealed bid auction so traders 
can learn from the order-book and from past prices.  
Two individuals on each side of the market are sufficient for the competitive 
equilibrium to be a NCE. A simple example considering optimal response is sufficient to 
show this. Suppose that there are two individuals each of two types. All have the payoff 
function given above, but individuals of type 1 and 2 have endowments of (a, 0, M) and 
(0, a, M), respectively, where the first component is the endowment of the first good, the 
second the endowment of the second good and the third the endowment of money. 
Suppose M > a/2 and α = 2 (the parameter in the payoff function), a trader of type 1 
offers to sell a/2 or less of good 1 at a price of 1 or more and to buy up to a/2 of good 2 at 
a price of 1 or less, it can be verified that this is an equilibrium outcome and the price of 
both goods is 1 ( p1 =  p2 =1).
 8  
There is a considerable amount of experimental evidence that in a single market the 
double auction mechanism yields efficient allocations. In their single-commodity double 
auctions, Gode and Sunder (1993 and 1997) found that it requires negligible skills or 
intelligence from traders for the market outcome to lie in close proximity of the 
competitive equilibrium. However, we consider two markets for two commodities; 
whether the complementarities between the two make a difference remains open. 
Obviously the task of trading on two markets simultaneously is markedly more 
demanding that trading on a single-commodity market. 
In their one-shot versions, the three games are the simplest price formation 
mechanisms that can be constructed, involving the maximum of one (sell-all and buy-
sell) and four (double auction) strategic variables. They can all be analyzed for their 
                                                 
7 It is necessary to take care of several cases; see Dubey and Shubik (1980) or Dubey (1982).  
8 From a strictly technical game theoretic point of view there is a continuum of non-cooperative equilibria, 
all with the same efficiency that are consistent with the competitive equilibrium outcome. Huber, Shubik, and Sunder, Three Minimal Market Institutions, 6/26/2009  11 
NCE. Unlike most other market experiments, these are general equilibrium full feedback 
models, not partial equilibrium constructs.  
The non-cooperative model of the general equilibrium  in theory, generates an 
asymmetry in actions when there are few agents, as can be seen in the sell-all model 
where a seller obtains an oligopolistic income from buying a commodity to which he has 
ownership claims (as contrasted with buying a commodity he does not have). This 
asymmetry is the largest in the buy-sell game, the next largest in the sell-all game and the 
smallest in the double auction (see tables 1 and 2 for numerical examples for 5+5 
traders).  
  Paradoxically, because MI agents (see Section 4 below) ignore their oligopolistic 
influence the theoretical prediction is that in all markets the price should be as close or 
closer to the competitive equilibrium than with oligopolistic human traders, but because 
of the random action there should be a variation in payoffs that is not present in the 
equilibrium analysis of the three games.  
  The speed of learning and the variation among players is not predicted by the 
static non-cooperative or general equilibrium theories. Many learning theories have been 
proposed and in the next section, we consider one non-learning and one simple learning 
algorithm. We only conjecture that as human subjects learn, variations in the outcomes of 
markets will diminish in the later periods (replications) of the game.  
4. DYNAMIC BENCHMARKS 
Richness of the data sets generated from market experiments with human subjects 
is not captured in the static NCE and CGE benchmarks. Unfortunately, there is no 
generally accepted disequilibrium theory of dynamic learning. We compare the results 
obtained from markets populated by profit-motivated human traders with the results from 
markets populated by two different kinds of simple algorithmic traders described in this 
section: the non-learning minimal intelligence (MI) benchmark (after Gode and Sunder 
1993’s zero-intelligence or ZI, see footnote 3), and adaptive learning agents (AL).  
1. Minimally Intelligent (MI) Traders. 
 In sell-all markets, given the money endowment of M, each agent picks an 
uniformly distributed random number between 0-M as its total money bid (for A and B 
combined). A second uniformly distributed random variable z between 0 and 1 is drawn 
to define the share of this money bid invested in A with (1-z) invested in B.  Huber, Shubik, and Sunder, Three Minimal Market Institutions, 6/26/2009  12 
In the buy-sell market, each trader offers to sell a randomly chosen quantity of the 
endowed good (from uniform distribution between 0-a) and bids a randomly chosen 
quantity of money for the other good (from uniform distribution between 0-M).  
In double auctions, with equal probability and independently, one trader is picked, 
one of the two markets is picked, and either bid or ask is picked. Given the trader’s 
current holdings of the two goods and cash, computer calculates the opportunity set (the 
maximum amount of bid the trader can make without diminishing its net payoff), and 
draws a random number between the current bid and this calculated upper limit (if the 
latter is more than the former) and submits it as a bid from this trader. In case of asks, the 
computer calculates the minimum amount of ask the trader can submit without 
diminishing its net payoff and submits a random number between this calculated lower 
limit and the current ask (if the latter is above the former), as the ask.
9 Higher bids 
replace lower ones as market bids, and lower asks replaced higher ones as market asks. 
Whenever market bids and market asks cross, a transaction is recorded at the price equal 
to the bid or ask, depending on which of the two was submitted earlier (see Appendix C).  
2. Adaptive Learning (AL) Traders.  
The adaptive learning (AL) algorithmic traders are a modification of the MI 
traders described in the preceding paragraphs. In sell-all and buy-sell markets, each AL 
trader keeps track of the past decisions which yielded the highest payoff and uses an 
adaptive learning parameter λ (set to 0.5 in the simulations) to adjust the most recent 
decision towards this “historical best” decision. The bid for the next period is then λ 
times the “historical best” decision plus (1- λ) times new random variables (as in MI).
10 
In double auction algorithm starts period 1 with a “price aspiration” of money/goods in 
the endowed quantities and uses each observed transaction price to adjust this aspiration 
by λ(transaction price –price aspiration). In addition to the constraints described above in 
description of MI traders, AL traders use this price aspiration as an additional constraint, 
not bidding above and not asking below this level. We consciously chose learning 
algorithms where the agents only look at their own earnings and their own decisions; 
market variables are not considered. 
                                                 
9 This means that bids are randomly distributed ~U(Current Bid, ((100/0.5) (((cA+1)cB)
0.5 - (cAcB)
0.5 ); asks 
are randomly distributed ~U((100/0.5) (-((cB-1)cA)
0.5 + (cAcB)
0.5 ), Current Ask). After each transaction, 
current bid is set to 0 and current ask is set to the initial cash balance of 4,000. 
10 With λ=0 the AL-simulation would be the same as the MI-simulation as then no learning would take 
place. Huber, Shubik, and Sunder, Three Minimal Market Institutions, 6/26/2009  13 
  The paths of markets populated by these two kinds of artificial players should 
serve as much as a warning as benchmarks. Rigid rule gaming in cleaned up abstract 
laboratory conditions contrasts sharply with the battlefield conditions of phenomena of 
substantive interest. Under the conditions chosen here, there is a unique analytical interior 
perfect non-cooperative equilibrium. In such situations, it is not difficult to find many 
dynamic procedures such as hill-climbing, optimal response, exponential lag weighted 
forecasting or adaptive forecasting rules that work well on a reasonably smooth terrain 
with a unique joint maximum. Kumar and Shubik, 2004 note that one can take an 
example such as the well known Scarf model of global instability with a unique 
equilibrium point and easily find a control process that gives contrary results.  
  The large body of work that applies dynamic programming microeconomic 
methods to problems of macroeconomics tells us little about learning and disequilibrium 
behavior. Our human and algorithmic games merely yield an empirical picture of the 
markets populated by various kinds of traders. It is easy to fit many process models to the 
data ex post. We, too, could try to fit some plausible rules of behavior to the observed 
data. The gains from such an exercise being doubtful; we refrain from doing so.   
5. THE EXPERIMENTAL SETUP 
We conducted and report on two independent sessions for each of the three 
market games considered in this paper. In each session, programmed in Z-tree software 
(see Fischbacher, 2007), the participants traded two goods—labeled A and B—for 
money. Each session had ten participants, five of them were endowed with some units of 
A and none of B, while the other five had some units of B and none of A.
11 All had the 
same starting endowment of money. Each session consisted of ten or twenty independent 
rounds of trading. Subjects’ “consumption” at the end of each round was accumulated in 
a “bank account” with the experimenter. No goods balances were carried over from one 
round to the next, and each subject was re-endowed with the ownership claims to goods 
A or B at the beginning of each round. In all treatments money is carried over to the 
following round (see descriptions of specific treatments below and in Table 3).  
(Insert Table 3 about here) 
5.1 Sell-All Call Market 
                                                 
11 In addition, we conducted one session with 20 participants, of whom 10 were of each type. Huber, Shubik, and Sunder, Three Minimal Market Institutions, 6/26/2009  14 
In Treatment 1 (sell-all Market) the initial endowments were 200 or 0 units of A, 
0 or 200 units of B, and 6,000 in cash. All units of A and B were sold automatically at a 
price derived from the set of bids submitted by the traders. In other words, subjects did 
not have to decide on the number of units they wished to sell; all their holdings of goods 
were sold at the prevailing market price. Consequently, they had ownership claim to the 
revenue from selling 200 units of the good they were endowed with. The only decision 
participants had to make was how much of their money endowment they wished to bid to 
buy good A and how much to bid to buy good B. (see Appendix A for instructions and 
the ‘trading screen’). Each sell-all market was repeated for 20 periods. 
As outlined above the unit prices of A and B are calculated as the respective sums 
of money bid for the respective good by all traders divided by the total units of each 
goods for sale. With 6,000 units of money endowment per trader there is more than 
enough money to reach general equilibrium at prices of 20 per unit of A and B. At 
general equilibrium traders would spend 2,000 on each good and keep 2,000 of their 
money endowment unspent. However, in a thin market with only a few traders, deviating 
from general equilibrium spending level may make sense to traders. When a trader 
spends more on the good he is endowed with, he raises its price and therefore his revenue 
from selling a part of his endowment of this good. Apart from the general equilibrium, 
there also exists a non-cooperative equilibrium in which traders spend 2213.4 on the good 
they own, 1810.6 on the other good, and keep 1976.0 unspent. Prices are slightly higher 
at 20.12 for both goods in this equilibrium. We conducted two runs of this treatment.  
5.2 Buy-Sell Call Market 
Unlike in Treatment 1, traders in this treatment directly control the goods they are 
endowed with, and decide how many, if any, units they wish to sell (in Treatment 1 all 
units were sold automatically). Again half of the traders are endowed with 200 units of A 
and none of B, while the other half are endowed with 200 units of B and none of A. Each 
trader has an initial endowment of 4,000 units of money at the beginning of the first 
round of the session. Money balances are carried over from one round to the next. Each 
buy-sell market was repeated for 20 periods. 
Traders make two decisions: The amount of their money to buy the good they do 
not own, and the number of units to sell out of the 200 units of the good they own.  
Prices for A and B are calculated by dividing the total investment for the 
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and conditions are the same as in Treatment 1.  Final holdings of goods are (100,100) 
each (prices are 20/20, each trader spends 2,000 for the good he does not own, and sells 
100 units of the good he owns). At the non-cooperative equilibrium with 5 traders on 
each side of the market traders of type 1 offer 78.05 units of the second good for sale and 
bid 1560.97 units of money for the first good. Traders of type 2 do the opposite (see 
Table 2). Final endowments are (78.05, 121.95) for traders of type 1 and (121.95, 78.05) 
for traders of type 2. Prices are 20/20. 
5.3 Double Auction Market 
Treatment 3 features a double auction market where participants can trade goods 
A and B in a continuous market for several periods. We simplify trading by considering 
only transactions for one unit at a time. To reduce the number of transactions needed to 
reach equilibrium levels, initial endowments of A and B are reduced from to (20/0, 0/20), 
so traders own 20 units of a good rather than 200. Each period lasts for 180 seconds to 
give the participants enough time to allow participants to trade ten units of goods they do 
not yet own, and by selling ten units of the good they are endowed with, required to reach 
equilibrium. Traders are endowed with 4,000 units of money, which is more than enough 
for trading. 
Competitive equilibrium and non-cooperative equilibrium prices coincide for the 
closed double auction model as was shown by Dubey (1982)
12. They are 100 for each 
good. The first run of the double auction market was repeated for 10 periods, the second 
run for 11 periods.  
  In the double auction experiments we allow market as well as limit orders. All 
orders are executed according to price and then time priority. Market orders have priority 
over limit orders in the order book. This means market orders are always executed 
instantaneously. Again holdings of money and goods are carried over from one round to 
the next. 
Participants receive current information about their cash and stock holdings, their 
wealth, and their transactions within the current period on the screen. In the centre of the 
screen they see the open order books and they have the opportunity to post limit or 
                                                 
12 The results for the non-cooperative equilibrium are delicately dependent on the formulation of details of 
the game; see Shubik (1959), Wilson (1978), and Schmeidler (1980). In some models it is possible that 
there is no pure strategy non-cooperative equilibrium, in others there may be a multiplicity of equilibria 
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market orders. On the left side of the screen transaction prices of the round are charted 
against time. 
6. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS 
We use seven aspects of market outcomes—allocative efficiency, level and 
volatility of prices,  symmetry of allocation across the two goods, money balances 
(except in double auctions where it is undefined), cross-trader dispersion of earnings, and 
trading volume—to assess the behavior of three market mechanisms relative to three 
static (autarky, competitive general equilibrium, and non-cooperative equilibrium), and 
two dynamic (markets populated by minimally intelligent or MI, and adaptive learning or 
AL agents) benchmarks. In addition, we examine the velocity of money, and kurtosis and 
autocorrelation of returns in double auctions.  
Allocative efficiency is measured by the total earnings of all traders as a fraction 
of the total earnings in competitive equilibrium.  The behavior of transaction prices is 
measured by market clearing prices for sell-all and buy-sell markets, and by average 
transaction prices (averaged across transactions within one period) in the double auction 
markets. Symmetry of allocation is the ratio of consumption of good A and B (= min 
(cA/cB, cB/cA)). Given the parameters chosen for these experiments, goods A and B should 
be allocated symmetrically at the competitive equilibrium, which has the symmetry 
measure of 1. Autarkic symmetry is 0. Money balances refer to the percentage of initial 
money left unspent after buying decisions are made (and before the proceeds of any sales 
are received) in sell-all and buy-sell markets.  
We report these four performance measures relative to the three abovementioned 
static benchmarks summarized in Table 4. Under autarky, efficiency and symmetry are 0, 
prices are undefined, and money balance is 100 percent. The competitive general 
equilibrium allocations are 100 units each of good A and B in sell-all and buy-sell 
markets, and 10 units of each good in the double auctions, yielding a symmetry measure 
of 1 in all cases. Prices are 20 in sell-all and buy-sell markets, and 100 in the double 
auction markets. 
(Insert Table 4 about here) 
The third benchmark for market performance is non-cooperative equilibrium for 
10 traders (five endowed with good A and five endowed with good B). Application of 
theory to the parameters of these markets yields bids of 2214 and 1811 for the owned and 
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model. In buy-sell model non-cooperative equilibrium requires selling 78 of the 200 units 
of the owned good and buying 78 with a bid of 1561 units of money. In the double 
auction traders should keep 11 of their 20 units of the good they are endowed with and 
buy 9 of the other. Unspent money balance is 32.92 percent in sell-all, 60.98 percent 
unspent in buy-sell, and not defined in the double auction. The resulting measures for 
symmetry are 0.82 in sell-all, 0.64 in buy-sell, and 0.82 in double auction. Prices are 
20.12 in sell-all, 20 in buy-sell, and 100 in double auction. 
Finally, we compare the results obtained from human traders in these three 
markets against computer simulations of markets populated with minimal intelligence 
(MI) and adaptive learning (AL) algorithmic agents described in Section 4. These 
computer simulations provide dynamic bases of comparison for markets populated by 
profit motivated human traders. We simulate each of the three market structures 1,000 
times with specified algorithmic traders.  
Each market statistic observed over the 1,000 replications is sorted into quitiles 
for each period. Bands in shades of gray in the background of Figures 1 to 9 show the 
distribution of the performance of the markets under the specified trading algorithms. 
Note that in Figures 1, 4 and 7, the double-auction simulations have zero dispersion and 
the quintiles collapse the bands of gray to zero width. 
6.1 Allocative Efficiency 
  Allocative efficiency of the markets is measured each period by the average 
amount earned by traders as a percentage of the competitive general equilibrium amount 
(1,000 points). Six panels of Figure 1 show the time series of efficiency in two 
replications of each of the three market games; in the left column of panels the human 
market data are charted against the background of quintiles of efficiency statistics from 
1,000 replications of markets populated by MI algorithmic traders and the right column 
has quintiles from AL algorithmic traders in the background. The autarky (efficiency = 0) 
benchmark is not included in the chart. The solid black line of competitive general 
equilibrium (efficiency = 100) frames the charts at the top and the non-cooperative 
equilibrium efficiency (for 5+5 = 10 players) is shown in a dotted line slightly below. In 
the following paragraphs we compare the efficiencies observed for specific market games 
against these benchmarks across the three market games.  
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  The first obvious observation is that the allocative efficiency of all six sessions of 
three market games is much closer to the predictions of competitive equilibrium (100 
percent for all three mechanisms), and non-cooperative equilibrium (99.5, 97.6, and 99.5 
percent for the three mechanisms) but far from the autarky prediction of zero.  
A second observation is that there are differences in the efficiency of the three 
mechanisms: the average efficiency is the highest for sell-all (97.7 and 97.6 for the two 
human sessions), followed by buy-sell (91.4 and 94.6 for the two human sessions) and 
the lowest for double auctions (87.8 and 93.2 for the two human sessions). Most 
experimental gaming results from double auction markets tend to report higher 
efficiencies (close to 100 percent). However, virtually all such experiments have been 
conducted in single market partial equilibrium settings.
13 With human subjects, the 
efficiency dominance of double auction observed for single-commodity markets is not 
preserved in general equilibrium settings in the presence of complementarities across two 
or more markets. If the values across the markets were not complementary, we expect the 
efficiencies to be higher.  
Third, the gray bands of quintiles of 1,000 replications of markets run with two 
kinds of algorithmic agents form the background of the six panels. Efficiency of sell-all 
markets with human traders is much greater than the median (= 81.5 percent on average 
across periods) and about equal to the maximum (= 97.8 percent on average across 
periods) achieved with MI traders. AL traders learn rapidly in the first three periods 
achieving a higher median efficiency (= 94.9 percent on average for periods 4-20) which 
is still lower than the efficiency of markets with human traders (97.7 and 97.6 percent 
respectively in the two runs).  
Efficiency of buy-sell markets with human traders is greater than the median (= 
87.2 percent on average across periods) and generally lies in the top quintile achieved 
with MI traders. Again, AL traders learn rapidly in the first three periods achieving a 
higher median efficiency (= 95.9 percent on average for periods 11-20) which is equal or 
higher than the efficiency of markets with human traders.  
Since double auction markets with algorithmic traders (MI as well as AL 
described above in Section 6.0) always achieve the upper bound of 100 in efficiency, the 
quintile bands in the two bottom panels of Figure 1 collapse to a line that coincides with 
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the CGE efficiency which is higher than the efficiency achieved by double auction 
markets populated by human traders. 
The first panel of Figure 8 shows the efficiencies observed in the buy-sell market 
with 20 (10+10) human traders. The average efficiency across the 20 periods is 98.1 
percent, as compared to 91.4 and 94.6 percent respectively in the two sessions with 10 
(5+5) traders. Median efficiency with AL traders gradually rises to about 96 percent. The 
data are consistent with the conjecture that the market outcomes approach GCE as the 
number of trader increases. 
(Insert Figure 2 about here) 
6.2 Price Levels 
  Each of the six panels in Figure 2 charts the observed prices (or average prices in 
DA) for goods A and B in two sessions of one of the three market games. The continuous 
horizontal line marks the CGE prices (20 in sell-all and buy-sell and 100 in DA). The 
corresponding NCE prices are 20.12, 20, and 100, and therefore do not show as a 
separate line in these charts. The data are charted against the background of gray quintile 
bands of prices from MI simulations in the left column; the same data are charted again in 
the right column of panels against the background of quintiles from AL simulations.  
In both sessions of the sell-all market, prices of good A as well as B are close to 
the competitive general equilibrium prediction of 20 (and NCE prediction of 20.12). 
Across-periods average prices of A and B are 18.92 and 20.90 respectively in one run and 
21.52 and 20.49 in the other. The price support selected for MI simulations predicts a 
price of 15, and the quintile bands of simulated MI price series for both goods are centred 
around 15. However, the simulated AL price series start out centred at 15 but adjust to the 
neighbourhood of CGE-NCE prediction of 20 during the first 10 periods and stay there. 
Also, note that the dispersion of AL prices is smaller than for MI prices. Apparently, even 
the simple sell-all market mechanism provides enough discipline and structure to adjust 
the price near the equilibrium level with the simple adaptive learning algorithm used 
here. 
(Insert Figure 2 about here) 
  Prices of goods A and B in the two sessions of buy-sell markets are qualitatively 
different from the results of the sell-all markets and across the two sessions. In the first 
session, the prices of goods A and B are distributed around 10 (cross-period average of 
11.32 for A and 9.24 for B) which is about one half of the CGE and NCE prediction of Huber, Shubik, and Sunder, Three Minimal Market Institutions, 6/26/2009  20 
20. In the second session, prices of both goods lie much closer to the CGE price of 20 
(cross-period average of 19.69 for A and 16.34 for B). The quintile bands of simulated 
MI price series for both goods are centred at the CGE-NCE prediction of 20. However, 
this is not true of the AL price series; these bands start out being centred at the CGE-NCE 
predication of 20, but quickly move down in the first three periods to settle around 17.  
Compared to the sell-all markets, both human as well as algorithmic prices in buy-sell 
markets exhibit a greater dispersion.  
  In the first session of the double auction market, range of prices (235-275 for an 
average of 261 for A and 246 for B) lay far above the CGE and NCE prediction of 100. 
In the second double auction session, these prices are lower (in the 155-265 range for an 
average of 225 for A and 170 for B), but are still significantly above the CGE-NCE 
prediction of 100. It is remarkable that these large deviations from equilibrium prices 
result in only a relatively small drop in the allocative efficiency of these auctions. As 
pointed out by Gode and Sunder (1993), the allocations (and therefore the efficiency) 
properties of the markets tend to be more robust than the prices. 
  A possible explanation for the divergence between the predicted price level and 
the actual price level in some of the games is that in spite of the theoretical power of 
backward induction in games of finite duration, the terminal conditions are not taken into 
account until close to the end of the session, a topic to which we return in the concluding 
section of the paper. 
  The mean transaction prices in the double auction simulations with MI traders are 
about 146, considerably above the CGE-NCE price of 100. To shed some light on the 
price dynamics in the double-auction the first panel of Figure 3 shows the within-period 
path of average transaction prices starting in high 200’s and converging tightly to the 
close neighbourhood of the CGE-NCE price of 100 in the later part of every trading 
period. Since the prices converge from above, the average of all transactions in period is 
about 146 in spite of convergence to 100 at the end of the period.  In contrast, the DA 
markets with human traders exhibit no such tendency and most transactions are 
distributed around the period mean. The mean of transaction prices in the double auction 
simulations with AL traders is about 70, which is considerably below the CGE-NCE 
price of 100. Again, as seen in the second panel of Figure 3, the price paths converge 
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every period. However, in this case, the prices converge from below, yielding a lower 
average of 70 in spite of convergence to equilibrium at the end of the period.  
(Insert Figure 3 about here) 
Table 5 shows that the double auction markets have active trading. Each period 
was allowed to run for three minutes and we ran 10 and 11 periods in runs 5 and 6 
respectively for a total duration of 30 and 33 minutes, and 994 and 1,114 transactions 
respectively. This translates into about one transaction every two seconds and 20 
transactions per trader per period on average in both runs. Recall that 20 (18) transactions 
per trader are necessary to reach CGE (NCE), with each trader buying 10 (9) units of the 
good he does not have and selling 10 (9) units of the good he is endowed with. However, 
as we saw in discussion of efficiency and symmetry, while the total number of 
transactions was close to CGE prediction, their distribution across traders showed greater 
variation. Beside, some traders bought as well as sold within the same market. 
(Insert Table 5 about here) 
Finally, the second panel of Figure 8 shows the prices observed in the buy-sell 
market with 20 (10+10) human traders. The average price across the 20 periods is 16.45 
for A and 16.40 for B, as compared to 11.3/9.2 and 19.9/16.3 respectively in the two 
sessions with 10 (5+5) traders. Prices in human markets are close to the median of AL 
simulations. The price data do not show any marked tendency to be closer to GCE price 
as the number of trader increases from 10 to 20. 
6.3 Symmetry 
  Figure 4 shows the asymmetry introduced by the oligopoly effect: in sell-all 
markets a trader gains an advantage from spending more for the good he is endowed with 
because of a feedback effect on income as his own bids influence the prices of the two 
goods. As shown in Table 4, CGE symmetry is 100 for all three markets, and NCE 
symmetry is 0.82, 0.64, and 0.82 for sell-all, buy-sell, and DA respectively. We see that 
observed symmetry is highest in the two sell-all markets (0.76 and 0.71 on average), 
lower in the two buy-sell (0.6 and 0.71 on average), and lowest in the double auction 
setting (0.53 and 0.6 on average). On the whole, the data are organized better by NCE 
than CGE.  The lower the symmetry the lower the average earnings, because skewed 
investment leads to lower earnings in the earning functions used in these experiments.  
The MI simulation quintiles of symmetry in sell-all as well as buy-sell markets 
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AL simulation quintiles rise rapidly during the first 4 periods to a median of about 0.6 
and stabilize there. Since in MI simulations of double auction traders are allowed to trade 
indefinitely, all traders do so until their holdings are perfectly symmetrical (and their 
payoffs reach the individual maximum). Accordingly, the quintile bands in the bottom 
two panels of Figure 4 collapse to 1.0 and therefore are not visible. 
(Insert Figure 4 about here) 
The third panel of Figure 8 shows the symmetry of holdings observed in the buy-
sell market with 20 (10+10) human traders. The average symmetry across the 20 periods 
is 0.81, as compared to 0.60 and 0.71 in the two sessions with 10 (5+5) traders. In AL 
simulations, the median of symmetry approaches approximately 0.65. The data are 
consistent with the conjecture that the market outcomes approach GCE as the number of 
traders increases. 
6.4 Price Volatility  
  In sell-all and buy-sell markets we only have a single price per commodity per 
period. Figure 2 shows the time series of prices for the three markets. The F-value of 
56.78 from Levene-test on equality of variances on period-to-period log price changes is 
significant at p < 0.001 which suggests that the dispersion of log prices changes in sell-all 
markets are significantly lower than in buy-sell markets. 
  With their sequence of transactions and intra-period returns, double auctions offer 
far more data. In two lab runs with human traders, the standard deviation of intra-period 
returns has median of 12.8 and 18.2 percent. The median is a comparable 21 percent in 
AL simulations, but much higher at 83 percent in MI simulations. As several recent 
experimental papers have shown, prices in DA markets are often sticky, i.e., move less 
than what would be justified by changes in fundamental values (see Kirchler, 2009 and 
Noussair and Powell, 2008). In light of these studies the relatively low volatility of 
markets populated by humans is not surprising.  
6.5 Money Balances 
The payoff functions were parameterized so that beyond a certain level we would 
expect that individuals would prefer to hold back on spending additional cash. Figure 5 
compares actual money balances (money left unspent) against the benchmarks of 
competitive equilibrium (33.3 percent in sell-all, 50 percent in buy-sell), non-cooperative 
equilibrium (32.9 percent in sell-all and 61 percent in buy-sell), and autarky (100 percent 
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distribution with a median of about 50 percent of the money not spent while the AL 
simulations this median starts with 50 percent but drops over the 20 periods to the 
neighborhood of 33.3 percent which is CGE prediction.  For buy-sell, the MI simulations 
have a median around the CGE predication of 50 percent but AL simulations show a 
higher median of about 56 percent. Since money balances remain unchanged in double 
auction, they are not shown.  
We find that money balances in the sell-all markets with profit-motivated human 
traders are close (33.63 and 29.99) to the CGE level of 33.33 percent, while in the buy-
sell markets traders kept more (73.72 and 60.47 percent) of their money than CGE 
prediction of 50 percent, but closer to the non-cooperative equilibrium of 60.98 percent. 
As a consequence prices in all sell-all markets are close to CGE-levels of 20, but are 
much lower in buy-sell markets. Our conjecture about this finding is that traders in buy-
sell markets were much more aware of their influence on prices of other people’s goods, 
than they were in the sell-all market.  
(Insert Figure 5 about here) 
The fourth panel of Figure 8 shows the unspent money holdings observed in the 
buy-sell market with 20 (10+10) human traders. The average unspent money across the 
20 periods is 62 percent of the initial endowment, as compared to 74 and 60 percent 
respectively in the two sessions with 10 (5+5) traders. The median of AL simulations is 
approximately 56 percent. The money holdings data do not show a marked tendency to 
be closer to GCE prediction of 50 percent as the number of trader increases from 10 to 
20. 
6.6 Cross-sectional Standard Deviation of Individual Traders’ Earnings 
  The cross-sectional standard deviation of individual traders’ period earnings for 
the 10 (5+5) trader sessions is shown in Figure 6. The CGE and NCE static benchmarks 
have no dispersion. Standard deviation is 15 and 16.5 percent of the CGE earnings in the 
two sell-all markets. Compared to the simulated MI median of about 60 percent and AL 
median of about 28 percent, the human sell-all markets yield lower dispersion.  
In the laboratory buy-sell markets (7 to 61 percent with median 34 percent) and 
double auctions (15 to 62 percent with median 30 percent) the standard deviation is 
higher than in sell-all markets (6 to 39 percent with median 13 percent).  
Turning to the simulations, in buy-sell, the MI simulated median of dispersion is 
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DA, the MI simulated median dispersion is lower at about 16.5 percent and AL simulated 
median is even lower at about 12.5 percent. In other words, the cross-sectional dispersion 
of earnings is higher than simulated earnings in 3 out of 6 comparisons.  
Except in the first few periods of the AL simulations, there is no evidence that the 
dispersion of earnings declines through the replications over the periods of a session. In 
contrast, in the only 20 (10+10) trader session we ran for buy-sell market (see bottom left 
panel of Figure 8), the cross sectional standard deviation is much lower (an average of 11 
percent) and declines steadily from approximately 24 percent in the first period to about 5 
percent in the 20
th period. Standard deviation of earnings in AL simulations is about 
twice as large as in human session. It seems reasonable to conclude that there are no 
significant differences among the standard deviation of earnings across the three 
mechanisms, and no consistent tendency of the standard deviation to decrease over 
replications.  
(Insert Figure 6 about here) 
6.7 Trading Volume as a Percent of CGE Volume 
  Observed trading volume as a percent of CGE volume is shown in Figure 7. In the 
top panels, presenting the sell-all markets we see that trading volume in the lab sessions 
was always somewhat lower (86.6 and 83.0 percent in runs 1 and 2 respectively) than 
required to reach CGE (100 percent). The volume is slightly higher in the buy-sell 
sessions (105.2 and 88.8 percent), although it is highly variable. In the double auctions 
(68.4 and 80.9 percent) volume is lowest on average but seems to increase over time.  
The median volume of MI as well as AL simulations is slightly above the CGE 
level of 100 percent in sell-all markets and about equal to the CGE level in buy-sell 
markets. In double auctions, all simulated quintiles collapse to CGE level of 100 percent 
and the bands do not show up in the figure. Both the (5+5) trader double auctions as well 
as the (10+10) trader buy-sell market (see the last panel of Figure 8) exhibit a tendency 
for the trading volume to increase over periods of a session. No such tendency is present 
in the (5+5) trader sell-all and buy-sell markets.  
(Insert Figure 7 about here) 
6.8 Velocity and Quantity theory  
Sell-all and buy-sell games do not allow much leeway for variations in velocity of 
money. Except for being able to hoard there is no strategic component to timing of trades. 
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essence, the quantity theory of money holds by definition. In contrast, double auction 
allows the opportunity for money to turn over many times through trading within the 
same period.  
Obtaining operationally tight definitions of money, its velocity and the 
endogenous variations in velocity is a theoretical challenge. Without detailed 
microstructure, the concept of the velocity of money is not operational. To define 
velocity, one needs a clear understanding of what is meant by money; a measure of its 
quantity; and an operational descriptions of the individuals’ trading opportunity sets and 
strategies. 
Our gaming set up assigns operational meaning to all of them albeit in a limited 
way.  There is only one means of payment in the game. In the double auction market, in 
each period there is an implicitly defined minimal trading grid size, the minimal time for 
a trade to be offered and completed. The individuals have the strategic choice as to when 
to bid and thus influence velocity. 
Table 5 shows the velocity (turnover) of both, money and goods. During the ten 
180-second trading periods with 10 traders, 200 units of goods generated a volume of 994 
(turnover rate of 5.0) in Run 1 and 1114 (turnover rate of 5.6) in run 2. The median 
turnover rates in simulated markets are slightly higher (5.46 For MI and 6.08 for AL) 
since all possible units get traded in these markets.  
Total money stock of 40,000 was used to make gross payments/receipts of 
252,363 (turnover of 6.3) in Run 1 and 214,716 (turnover of 5.4) in Run 2. In other 
words, each unit of money changed hands about six times during each session, and each 
unit of goods was traded more than five times. Because of the continuous trading in 
single units of goods, the total amount money needed to facilitate this trading was much 
less than what we provided. At the prices we observed (the maximum was 500) one can 
argue that 5,000 units of money should have been enough to move from initial 
endowment to CGE position in single unit transactions by traders if they alternate 
between selling an endowed unit and buying a unit of the other good.
14 Also, note that in 
simulated markets which had lower prices, turnover rates for money are also much lower 
(4.02 for MI and 2.18 for AL). The reason for the lower turnover rates for money are the 
                                                 
14 We have not yet conducted an experiment to verify whether providing a smaller amount of money will 
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lower prices in the simulation – e.g. prices in the AL-simulation were on average around 
70, while in the lab runs they were consistently above 200.  
There is no straight forward way of translating this velocity observed in the 
laboratory to natural economies; these data would be useful in comparative studies of 
alternative mechanisms in laboratory environments. 
6.9 Kurtosis and Autocorrelation  
Financial market returns are known to exhibit (1) excess kurtosis (fat tails relative 
to Gaussian distribution), (2) no significant autocorrelation of returns, and (3) significant 
autocorrelations of simple derivatives of returns, e.g. absolute or squared returns. The last 
finding hints at volatility clustering, as a significant autocorrelation of absolute returns 
shows that large price changes are more likely to occur after other price changes (e.g. 
Mandelbrot 1963a,b, Plott and Sunder 1982, Bouchaud and Potters 2001,  Plerou et al. 
1999, Cont 1997, 2001, and Voit 2003).  
In the data generated from the double auction markets we find excess kurtosis (8.9 
for good A and 9.0 for good B in Run 1, and 28.8 and 11.7 respectively in Run 2). These 
numbers are comparable to the excess kurtosis in the range of 5 to 20 found in stock 
market returns (variations depending on time horizon and whether tick data or daily 
closing prices are used).  
We also calculated kurtosis for our MI- and AL-simulations. In the MI-
simulations median kurtosis was 19, with a minimum of -2 and a maximum of 162. This 
is consistent with earlier findings that simple double-auction markets regularly produce 
excess kurtosis. Somewhat puzzling we found that median kurtosis in the 1000 AL-
simulation runs was -2.9 with a maximum of 9 and a minimum of -3. Here 95 percent of 
the runs exhibit negative kurtosis. Most price changes were in the same range and large 
outliers are missing in these runs, obviously resulting from the learning mechanism 
(updating of price aspiration) we used.  
Figure 9 presents data on the autocorrelation functions for 20 lags of retuns (top 
panel) and absolute returns (bottom panel) in the double auction. In the four series of 
laboratory returns we have no significant autocorrelations of returns after lag 1, which is 
consistent with the price series being random walks. The negative lag 1 autocorrelation is 
a well-known result of bounce between bids and asks in the double-auction mechanism. 
Since the simulations also involve bids and asks we observe the same negative 
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The autocorrelation function of absolute returns, however, is consistently outside 
the significance bounds for both goods in Run 1 (but not that long in Run 2), suggesting 
the possibility—but no certainty—of volatility clustering in these laboratory markets. For 
the simulations we find almost no persistence in autocorrelation in absolute returns and 
thus no volatility clustering.  
(Insert Figure 9 about here) 
6.10 Ranking of the Three Market Mechanisms 
Competitive and non-cooperative equilibria are defined for the abstract end of the 
institutional spectrum of price formation processes.  As we discussed in the introduction, 
the three minimal market institutions examined here can be located ordinally right next to 
this abstract end of the spectrum of market institutions. In the preceding section, we have 
presented the performance of the three mechanisms using various measures of 
performance. Table 6 presents the ordinal rankings of the three mechanisms with respect 
to their distance from the abstract end along these six dimensions on the basis of how 
they perform when they are populated by human, and MI and AL algorithmic traders. 
(Insert Table 6 about here) 
While there are some deviations in six specific measures of performance, it is 
clear that, on the whole, when these mechanisms are populated by profit-motivated 
human traders, the outcomes of the sell-all mechanism is the closest to the CGE as well 
as NCE predictions, followed by buy-sell and double auction in that order. This ordinal 
ranking of correspondence to the predictions of the abstract models matches the ranking 
of specificity (i.e., additional assumptions) needed to define each market mechanism. 
Perhaps it is not surprising that the increasing specificity of market mechanisms adds 
some distance between their performance and the abstract benchmark. To what degree 
this process will continue with additional specificity remains to be explored. 
When profit-motivated human traders are replaced by MI and AL algorithmic 
traders, the quintile bands from 1,000 replications of simulated markets suggest that the 
rankings of their outcomes change: DA is closest to CGE predications (followed by buy-
sell and sell-all) and buy-sell is closest to NCE (followed by sell-all and DA). In other 
words, none of the three mechanisms dominates the other two in its proximity to the 
predications of the static models. 
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We report the performance of three minimal market mechanisms which are closed, 
full feedback models with explicit price-formation mechanisms and trade involving some 
form of money. The experiment reveals that (1) the non-cooperative and general 
competitive equilibrium models provide a reasonable anchor to locate most but not all the 
observed outcomes of the three market mechanisms; (2) there is some evidence that 
outcomes tend to get closer to GCE predictions as the number of players increases; (3) 
unlike well known results from many partial equilibrium double auctions, prices and 
allocations in our double auctions with full feedback reveal significant and apparently 
persistent deviations from CGE predictions; (4) the outcome paths from the three market 
mechanisms exhibit significant and persistent differences among them; and (5) since the 
dynamics of markets populated by profit-motivated human subjects is at least partially 
captured in markets when humans subjects are replaced by simple algorithmic traders, the 
importance of market structures in determining their outcomes is reinforced.  
The comparison of market mechanisms populated by profit-motivated human traders 
with the frequency distribution (quintiles) of those populated by MI (minimally 
intelligent) and AL (adaptive learning) agents is a methodological innovation of this 
paper. In contrast, the earlier work in experimental gaming focuses on comparison with 
static predications of various equilibrium models alone. Presenting experimental results 
jointly with the frequency distribution of simulations allows–in our opinion–a better 
understanding of both the experimental results and the simulations.  
The study of these three minimal mechanisms raises a basic issue about the level of 
specificity/generality at which one should identify the properties of (market) 
mechanisms. For example, on one hand, the double auction is an obvious—and 
extreme—abstraction from the complex rules and design of, say, the New York Stock 
Exchange. If each article in its rulebook and each feature of its design of a market helps 
define and determine its properties, every detail matters, and nothing can be abstracted 
away in the study of market mechanisms. Considered in their full details, no two markets 
are alike, and the study of market mechanism would constitute a voluminous 
encyclopedia with little generality and therefore little scientific content.  
On the other hand, the competitive general equilibrium models of markets abstract 
away the details of trading mechanisms until they are reduced to become identical. The 
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This paper takes only a small step away from total generality by considering three 
minimally specific trading mechanisms—sell all, buy-sell, and double auction—in forms 
which are still highly abstract relative to what we see in the world of trade and 
commerce. We find that introducing even a small amount of specificity differentiates the 
paths markets take towards the general equilibrium prediction. It seems reasonable to 
conjecture that additional specificity in market mechanisms may reveal further 
differentiation in their properties, albeit at a diminishing rate and importance.  
If the properties of mechanisms depend on the level of specificity/generality at which 
we study them, what is the appropriate level for their use? This question is not unique to 
economics and is shared with other sciences. Boyle’s Law (pressure x absolute 
temperature = a constant) for gases, and Ohm’s Law (voltage / current = a constant) for 
electricity are so powerful and simple in their generality, and yet must be modified to 
specific gases and circuits in most practical applications. A science consists of a spectrum 
of laws that extend from most general approximations at one end to increasingly specific 
details at the other where it blends into engineering. The appropriate level of detail and 
specificity can be determined only from the question sought to be answered through the 
investigation. 
As social institutions, mass market mechanisms may have evolved to minimize the 
importance of individual social psychological factors and the experiments presented here 
support this observation. They also suggest that the non-cooperative equilibrium 
approach is more fundamental than the competitive equilibrium, with the former 
encompassing the latter as a special limiting case. Furthermore the former requires the 
full specification of price formation mechanisms and the simplest of such mechanisms 
are studied here.  
An important question, both in theory and in experimentation has been raised here in 
the treatment of terminal value of money to the experimental subjects. Theory requires 
that terminal or “salvage value” conditions be imposed if the game has a finite 
termination. Furthermore in many formal economic models a discount factor plays an 
important role. Yet our runs indicated that for the most part human players pay little 
attention to terminal conditions until close to the very end. In further experimentation it 
appears to be highly desirable to devise an appropriate control to study this phenomenon. 
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Table 1: Non-cooperative Equilibria for Sell-all Model 










2 21.14  21.14  0.6277a  0.3723a  0.2953M  0.4834  αa 
3 20.40  20.40  0.5838a  0.4162a  0.3200M  0.4929  αa 
4 20.20  20.20  0.5626a  0.4374a  0.3267M  0.4961  αa 
5 20.12  20.12  0.5501a  0.4499a  0.3293M  0.4975  αa 
10 20.03  20.03  0.5250a  0.4750a  0.3323M  0.4994  αa 
Many 20.00  20.00  0.5000a  0.5000a  0.3333M  0.5000  αa 
 
 
Table 2: Non-cooperative Equilibria in Buy-sell Market 
(Parameter values used in the laboratory experiments: a =200; M = 4,000; α = 10) 
 
 No.  
of Agents 







2  20.00 20.00 0.8000a 0.2000a  0.8000M  0.4000  αa 
3  20.00 20.00 0.6923a 0.3077a  0.6923M  0.4615  αa 
4  20.00 20.00 0.6400a 0.3600a  0.6400M  0.4800  αa 
5  20.00 20.00 0.6098a 0.3902a  0.6098M  0.4878  αa 
10  20.00 20.00 0.5525a 0.4475a  0.5525M  0.4972  αa 
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Table 3: Design Parameters for Six Sessions of Three Market Games 
Endowments of Individuals  Runs  Market 





1+2  Sell-All  200 for 5 
traders; 
0 for 5 
others 











200 for 5 
traders; 
0 for 5 
others 











20 for 5 
traders; 
0 for 5 
others  
0 for 5 
traders; 
20 for 5 
others 







Table 4 Equilibrium Predictions for the Three Market Games  
Runs  Market 




1+2  Sell-All  PA= PB= NA 
XA= 200 or 0 
XB= 200 or 0 
Net money =0 
Points = 0 
PA= PB= 20 
XA= XB = 100 
 
Net money =0 
Points = 1,000
PA= PB= 20.12 
Xown= 110  
Xother = 90 
Net money = 0 
Points = 995 
3+4  Buy-Sell  PA= PB= NA 
XA= 200 or 0  
XB= 200 or 0 
Net money =0 
Points = 0 
PA= PB= 20 
XA= XB = 100 
 
Net money =0 
Points = 1,000
PA= PB= 20 
Xown= 122  
Xother= 78 
Net money = 0 
Points = 976 
5+6  Double 
Auction 
PA= PB= NA 
XA= 20 or 0 
XB= 20 or 0 
Net money =0 
Points = 0 
PA= PB= 100 
XA= 20 or 0 
XB= 20 or 0 
Net money =0 
Points = 1,000
PA= PB= 100 
XA= 11 
XB= 9 
Net money = 0 
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Table 5: Market data on the two double auction markets 
 














Run 5  200  40,000     994  252,362  5.0  6.3  19.9  Human 
Run 6  200  40,000  1,114  214,716  5.6  5.4  20.3 
MI 200  40,000  1,092  160,747      5.5*      4.0*  21.8  Simulations 
AL  200  40,000  1,216    87,309    6.1*    2.2*  24.3 
*Median over 1,000 replications of the market. 
 
 
Table 6: Ranking of Three Market Mechanisms on the Basis of Distance 


















Competitive General Equilibrium 
Human  1 1  1 1 1  2  1.17 
MI  3 2  3 2 3  3  2.67 
Sell-All 
AL  3 1  3 2  2.5 3  2.4 
 
2.08 
Human  2 2  2 2 3  1  2.00 
MI  2 1  2 1 2  2  1.67 
Buy-Sell 
AL  2 2  2 3  2.5 2  2.25 
 
1.97 
Human  3  NA. 3 3 2  3  2.80 
MI  1 NA  1  3  1  1  1.4 
DA 




Human  1 1  2 1 1  1  1.17 
MI  3 2  3 2 3  3  2.67 
Sell-All 
AL  3 1  2.5  2  2.5 3  2.33 
 
2.06 
Human  2 2  1 2 3  2  2.00 
MI  2 1  2 1 2  2  2.00 
Buy-Sell 
AL  2 2  1 3  2.5 2  2.1 
 
1.70 
Human  3 NA  3  3  2  3  2.80 
MI  1 NA  1  3  1  1  1.40 
DA 




 Huber, Shubik, and Sunder, Three Minimal Market Institutions, 6/26/2009  37 
Figure 1: Efficiency of Allocations (Average Earnings)   
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 Figure 2: Average Transaction Prices of Goods A and B in the Lab 
and in the MI and AL Simulations (quintiles of distribution of 1000 
runs) 
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Figure 3: Double Auction Transaction Price Paths within individual 
Trading Periods with MI Traders (grey lines show individual runs, 
the black line with diamonds the average) 
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Figure 4: Symmetry of Allocations 
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Figure 5: Unspent Money as Percentage of Initial Endowment  
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Figure 6: Standard Deviation of Individual Earnings per Period 
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Figure 7: Goods traded as Percentage of Trade needed to achieve GCE 
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Figure 8: Overview Data for Buy-Sell Market with n=20 traders  
(1 lab run + AL background) 
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Figure 9: Autocorrelation functions of returns and absolute returns 
in the Double Auction (human and simulation runs)  
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Appendix A: Experimental instructions 
Market Game 1: Sell-All (with money carried over), Sessions 1 and 2 
This is an experiment in market decision making. The instructions are simple, and 
if you follow them carefully and make good decisions, you will earn more money, which 
will be paid to you at the end of the session. 
  This session consists of several periods and has 10 participants. At the beginning 
of each period, five of the participants will receive as income the proceeds from selling 
200 units of good A, for which they have ownership claim. The other five are entitled to 
the proceeds from selling 200 units of good B. In addition you will get 6,000 units of 
money at the start of the experiment. Depending on how many goods A and B you buy 
and on the proceeds from selling your goods this amount will change from period to 
period. 
During each period we shall conduct a market in which the price per unit of A and 
B will be determined. All units of A and B will be sold at this price, and you can buy 
units of A and B at this price. The following paragraph describes how the price per unit 
of A and B will be determined.  
 In each period, you are asked to enter the amount of cash you are willing to pay 
to buy good A, and the amount you are willing to pay to buy good B (see the center of 
Screen 1). The sum of these two amounts cannot exceed your current holdings of money 
at the beginning of the period. 
The computer will calculate the sum of the amounts offered by all participants for 
good A. (= SumA). It will also calculate the total number of units of A available for sale 
(nA, which will be 1,000 if we have five participants each with ownership claim to 200 
units of good A). The computer then calculates the price of A, PA = SumA/nA. 
If you offered to pay bA to buy good A, you will get bA/PA units of good A. 
The same procedure is carried out for good B.  
Your final money balance will be your money at the beginning of the period plus 
the money from the sales of your initial entitlement to proceeds from A or B less the 
amount you pay to buy A and B: 
New money holdings = Money at start of period + PA*#A + PB*#B – bA – bB  
With #A and #B being either 200 or zero.  
The number of units of A and B you buy (and consume), will determine the 
number of points you earn for the period: 
Points earned = 10 * (bA/PA * bB/PB)
0.5 
Example: If you buy 100 units of A and 100 units of B in the market you earn  
10 * (100 * 100)
0.5 = 1,000 points.  
Your money holdings will only be relevant in the last period. At this time the 
starting endowment of 6,000 units of money will be deducted from your final money 
holdings. The net holdings, positive or negative, will be divided by 4 and this number 
will be added to your total points earned. 
  Screen 2 shows the example of calculations for Period 3. There are 10 participants 
in the market, and half of them have 200 units of A, the other half 200 units of B. Here 
we see a subject entitled to proceeds from 200 units of good A.  
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Earnings for the 
current period 
Information on bids 
and transactions in 
good A 
Information on bids 
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number/1000 will be 
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The earnings of each period (shown in the last column in the lower part of Screen 2) will 
be added up at the end of session. At the end they will be converted into real Dollars at 
the rate of 1,000 points = 1 US$, and this amount will be paid out to you. 
 
How to calculate the points you earn: 
Points earned = 10 * (bA/PA * bB/PB)
0.5 
To give you an understanding for the formula the following table might be useful. It 
shows the resulting points from different combinations of goods A and B. It is obvious, 
that more goods mean more points, however, to get more goods you usually have to pay 
more, thereby reducing your money balance, which will limit your ability to buy in later 
periods. 
 
  Units of good B you buy and consume 
  0 25 50 75  100 125 150 175 200 225 250 
0  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
25  0 250 354 433 500 559 612 661 707 750 791 
50  0 354 500 612 707 791 866 935 1000 1061 1118 
75  0 433 612 750 866 968 1061 1146 1225 1299 1369 
100  0 500 707 866  1000 1118 1225 1323 1414 1500 1581 
125  0 559 791 968  1118 1250 1369 1479 1581 1677 1768 
150  0  612  866 1061 1225 1369 1500 1620 1732 1837 1936 
175  0  661  935 1146 1323 1479 1620 1750 1871 1984 2092 
200  0  707 1000 1225 1414 1581 1732 1871 2000 2121 2236 








250  0  791 1118 1369 1581 1768 1936 2092 2236 2372 2500 
Examples:  
1)  If you buy 50 units of good A and 75 units of good B and both prices are 20, then 
your points from consuming the goods are 612. Your net change in money is  
200 (A or B) * 20 = 4,000 minus 50 * 20 – 75 * 20 = 1,500, so you have 1,500 
more to spend or save in the next period. 
2)  If you buy 150 units of good A and 125 units of good B and both prices are 20, 
then your points from consuming the goods are 1369. Your net cash balance is 
200 (A or B) * 20 = 4,000 minus 150 * 20 – 125 * 20 = -1,500, so you have 1,500 
less to spend or save in the next period. 
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Market Game 2: Buy-Sell (with money carried over), Sessions 3 and 4  
This is an experiment in market decision making. The instructions are simple, and 
if you follow them carefully and make good decisions, you will earn more money, which 
will be paid to you at the end of the session. 
  This session consists of several periods and has 10 participants. At the beginning 
of each period, five of the participants will receive ownership claim to 200 units of good 
A, and the other five will receive ownership claim to 200 units of good B. In addition 
each participant will get 4,000 units of money at the start of period 1 of the experiment. 
Each participant is free to sell any or all the goods he/she owns for units of 
money. The amount of your money balance will change depending on the proceeds from 
selling your goods, and how many units of goods A and B you buy, and this  balance will 
be carried over from period to period. 
During each period we shall conduct a market in which the price per unit of A and 
B will be determined. All units of A and B will be sold at this price, and you can buy 
units of A and B at this price. The following paragraphs describe how the price per unit 
of A and B will be determined.  
 In each period, you are asked to enter the cash you are willing to pay to buy the 
good you do not own (say A), and the number of units of the good you own that you are 
willing to sell (say B) (see the center of Screen 1). The cash you bid to buy cannot 
exceed your money balance at the beginning of the current period, and the units you 
offer to sell cannot exceed your ownership claim of that good (200). 
The computer will calculate the sum of the amounts of money offered by all 
participants for good A. (= SumA). It will also calculate the total number of units of A 
offered for sale (qA), and determine the price of A, PA = SumA/qA. 
If you offered to pay bA to buy good A, you will get to buy bA/PA units of good A. 
The same procedure is carried out for good B to arrive at the price PB = SumB/qB and the 
number of units you buy  = bB/PB.  
The amount of money you pay to buy one good is subtracted, and the proceeds 
from the sale of the other good are added, to your initial money balance of 4,000, in order 
to arrive at your final money balance.  
Both goods are perishable and must be either sold or consumed in the current 
period. The number of units of A and B you own at the end of the period, cA and cB 
(unsold units of owned good and purchased units of the other good) will be consumed 
and determine the number of points you earn for the period: 
Points earned = 10 * (cA* cB)
0.5
 
Example: If you sell 75 units of A and buy 90 units of B in the market you earn  
10 * ((200-75) * 90)
0.5 = 1,061 points.  
Your cash balance holdings will help determine the points you earn only in the 
last period. At this time the starting endowment of 4,000 units of money will be deducted 
from your final money holdings. The net holdings (which may be negative) will be 
divided by 2 and this number will be added to (or subtracted from) your total points 
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so far. This 
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Screen 2 shows an example of calculations for Period 2. There are 10 participants in the 
market, and half of them have 200 units of A, the other half 200 units of B. Here we see a 






 Huber, Shubik, and Sunder, Three Minimal Market Institutions, 6/26/2009  51 
The earnings of each period (shown in the last column in the lower part of Screen 2) will 
be added up at the end of session. At the end they will be converted into real Dollars at 
the rate of 1,000 points = 1 US$ and this amount will be paid out to you. 
 
How to calculate the points you earn: 
The points earn each period are calculated with the following formula: 
Points earned = 10 * (cA* cB)
0.5 
The following table may be useful to understand this relationship. It shows the resulting 
points from different combinations of goods A and B. Consuming more goods means 
more points. However, to consume more goods now you usually have to buy more and 
sell less, reducing your cash balance carried into the future.  
 
  Units of good B you keep and consume 
  0 25 50 75  100 125 150 175 200 225 250 
0  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
25  0 250 354 433 500 559 612 661 707 750 791 
50  0 354 500 612 707 791 866 935 1000 1061 1118 
75  0 433 612 750 866 968 1061 1146 1225 1299 1369 
100  0 500 707 866  1000 1118 1225 1323 1414 1500 1581 
125  0 559 791 968  1118 1250 1369 1479 1581 1677 1768 
150  0  612  866 1061 1225 1369 1500 1620 1732 1837 1936 
175  0  661  935 1146 1323 1479 1620 1750 1871 1984 2092 
200  0  707 1000 1225 1414 1581 1732 1871 2000 2121 2236 








250  0  791 1118 1369 1581 1768 1936 2092 2236 2372 2500 
 
Examples:  
1)  If you sell 150 units of good A at a price of 25 (keeping 50) and buy 125 units of 
good B at a price of 22, you earn 612 (= 50*125) points from consuming the 
goods in the current period, and your net cash balance carried over to the 
following period changes by +1,000 (= 150 * 25 – 125 *22). You have 1,000 in 
cash to spend in the future. 
2)  If you buy 150 units of good A and sell 75 units of good B (keeping 125) and both 
prices are 20, then your points from consuming the goods are 1369. Your net cash 
balance changes by -1,500 (= -150 * 20 + 75* 20), so you have 1,500 less to 
spend in the future. 
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Market Game 3: Double Auction (money not carried over), Sessions 5 and 6 
This is an experiment in market decision making. The instructions are simple, and 
if you follow them carefully and make good decisions, you will earn more money, which 
will be paid to you at the end of the session. 
  This session consists of several periods and has 10 participants. At the beginning 
of each period, five of the participants will receive 20 units of good A, and the other five 
will receive 20 units of good B. In addition each participant will get 4,000 units of money 
at the start of period 1 of the experiment (see top of Screen 1). 
Each participant is free to sell any or all the goods he/she owns, or buy more units 
for money. The amount of your money balance will change depending on the proceeds 
from selling or buying goods A and B, and this balance will be carried over from period 
to period. 
During each period we shall conduct a market in which t A and B will be traded 
in a double auction. The following paragraphs describe how A and B can be traded.  
Trading 
See Screen 1. There is a chart of transaction prices on the left, followed by two 
columns to trade Good A and two columns to trade Good B.  
 You  can  buy or sell one unit of either good in each transaction. You can buy 
goods in one of two ways:   
(1) Enter a bid price in the light blue box above the red BID button on your screen, click 
on this red button, and wait for some trader to accept your bid (i.e., sell to you at your bid 
price); or 
(2) Click on the red BUY button to buy one unit of the good at the price listed at the top 
of the ASK column above this red button. 
 Similarly,  you  can  sell one unit of either good in one of two ways:  
(1) Enter an ask price in the light blue box above the red ASK button on your screen,  
click on this red button, and wait for someone else to accept your ask (i.e., buy from you 
at your ask price); or 
(2) Click on the SELL red button to sell one unit of a good at the price listed at the top of 
the BID column above this red button. 
  You may enter as many bids and asks as you wish. A new bid (to buy) is allowed 
only if you have sufficient amount of cash on hand in case all your outstanding bids are 
accepted (to prevent your cash holdings from dropping below zero). A new ask (to sell) is 
allowed if you have sufficient units of goods to sell in case all your asks are accepted (to 
prevent your units of goods from falling below zero). 
  Both goods are perishable and must be either sold or consumed in the current 
period. The number of units of A and B you own at the end of the period, cA and cB will 
be consumed and determine the number of points you earn for the period: 
Points earned = 100 * (cA* cB)
0.5 
Example: If you sell own 7 units of A and 12 units of B at the end of period, you earn  
100 * (7 * 12)
0.5 = 916.5 points.  
Your cash balance holdings will help determine the points you earn only in the 
last period. At this time the starting endowment of 4,000 units of money will be deducted 
from your final money holdings. The net holdings (which may be negative) will be 
divided by 2 and this number will be added to (or subtracted from) your total points 
earned.  
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The earnings of each period (shown in the last column in the lower part of Screen 2) will 
be added up at the end of session. At the end they will be converted into real Dollars at 
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How to calculate the points you earn: 
The points earned each period are calculated with the following formula: 
Points earned = 100 * (cA* cB)
0.5 
The following table may be useful to understand this relationship. It shows the resulting 
points from different combinations of goods A and B. Consuming more goods means 
more points. However, to consume more goods now you usually have to buy more and 
sell less, reducing your cash balance carried into the future.  
 
  Units of good B you consume 
  0 1 2 5  10 15 20 25 30 35 40 
0  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1  0 100 141 224 316 387 447 500 548 592 632 
2  0 141 200 316 447 548 632 707 775 837 894 
5  0 224 316 500 707 866 1000 1118 1225 1323 1414 
10  0 316 447 707  1000 1225 1414 1581 1732 1871 2000 
15  0 387 548 866  1225 1500 1732 1936 2121 2291 2449 
20  0  447  632 1000 1414 1732 2000 2236 2449 2646 2828 
25  0  500  707 1118 1581 1936 2236 2500 2739 2958 3162 
30  0  548  775 1225 1732 2121 2449 2739 3000 3240 3464 
























40  0  632  894 1414 2000 2449 2828 3162 3464 3742 4000 
 
Example: If you sell 15 units of good A (keeping 5) and buy 12 units of good B you earn 
775 (= 100*(5 * 12)
0.5 ) points from consuming the goods in the current period. 
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j= the bid of individual i (i=1,…,n) in market j (j=1,2) 
A = utility function scaling parameter, the same for each trader 
pj= price of commodity j 
m= initial money holding of each trader 
(a,0)= initial holding of goods of type 1 
(0,a)= initial holdings of goods of type 2. 
 
Calculations for Sell-All 
An individual i initially endowed with good j wishes to maximize his payoff function 
which is of the form: 
) ( 2 1
2 1






i + − − + = ∏  
 
 
The calculation for the sell-all model requires to solution of the two equations derived for 
each trader from the first order conditions on the bidding in the two goods markets. By 
symmetry we need only be concerned with one type of trader. 
 
We obtain the equation 






















As n becomes large this yields b1 = b2.  Substituting in for b1  in terms of b2 we can 
calculate Table 1.  
Calculations for buy-sell 
The payoff function for Player 1 in the buy-sell market is given by 
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A + − + − = ∏  
And similarly for Player 2; 
where qj
i  is the amount of good j offered for sale by individual i in market j 
We obtain from individual maximization of these equations the following values 
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Appendix C: Algorithm Used for Double Auction with Minimally Intelligent (MI) 
and Adaptive Learning (AL) Traders 
 
1. Total number of traders = n 
Endowment: EA/EB/M 
Current balances at any point of time during trading: cA/cB/m 
Adaptive learning parameter: λ = 0.5 (set λ = 0 for no learning, i.e., MI algorithm) 
Set initial price aspiration = total money endowment/total goods endowment  
 
2. Randomly pick one of the n traders in the market with equal probability (with 
replacement); For the chosen trader, randomly pick one of the two markets with equal 
probability (with replacement). 
 
3. For the chosen market, randomly pick bid or ask with equal probability (with 
replacement) 
 
3a. If bid is picked for the chosen trader for the chosen market A: 
Calculate d = (100/2) (((cA+1)cB)
0.5 - (cAcB)
0.5 ). Pick a uniform random number U 
~ (current bid, min (d, price aspiration), and submit it as a bid for A. 
 
3b. If bid is picked for the chosen trader for the chosen market B: 
Calculate d = (100/2) (((cB+1)cA)
0.5 - (cAcB)
0.5 ). Pick a uniform random number U 
~ (current bid, min (d, price aspiration), and submit it as a bid for B. 
 
3c. If ask is picked for the chosen trader for the chosen market A: 
Calculate e = (100/2) ((-(cA-1)cB)
0.5 + (cAcB)
0.5 ). Pick a uniform random number 
U ~ (max(e, price aspiration), current ask), and submit it as an ask for A. 
 
3d. If ask is picked for the chosen trader for the chosen market B: 
Calculate e = (100/2) ((-(cB-1)cA)
0.5 + (cAcB)
0.5 ). Pick a uniform random number 
U ~ (max(e, price aspiration), current ask), and submit it as an ask for B. 
 
4. If the new bid is higher than the current bid, it becomes the current bid; if the new ask 
is lower than the current ask, it becomes the current ask.  
 
5. Whenever current bid and current ask cross, record a transaction at price equal to 
current bid or current ask (whichever was submitted earlier). Adaptively adjust new price 
aspiration = existing price aspiration + λ * (transaction price – existing price aspiration). 
 
6. Let the simulation run for 25,000 iterations to complete a period. At the end of the 
period, Use the final cA , cB, and m for calculating earnings of each trader. 
 
7. Repeat over the specified number of periods to complete the market.  
 
8. Repeat over the specified number of replications of the market. 
 